1. From here onward, the italicized parts of translations are modified.

2. Strictly speaking, theocracy is an extreme type of hierocracy, where a chief priest is also king. See later discussion on the terminology of "caesaro-papism."

3. "The term 'charisma' shall be understood to refer to an extraordinary quality of a person, regardless of whether this quality is actual, alleged, or presumed" (Weber 1946, 295).

4. Theocracy is a hierocratic rulership in which "a high priest (who) is also king." (Weber 1968, 1150). On the other hand, hierocracy generally means the rulership in which a secular ruler is "legitimated by priests, either as an incarnation or in the name of God" (Weber 1968, 1150).

Weber sometimes calls Chinese rulership "theocracy" (1958, 143, 275), when he puts emphasis on the religious character of the emperor. But, as a whole, he describes the patrimonial China as a well-controlled caesaro-papism (1968, 1161; 1952, 110). Weber, one time, called the Japanese emperor "the theocratic head of the state" (1958, 272), when he emphasized the pontifical role of the emperor in the Tokugawa Shogunate. However, he describes the feudal Japan as a controlled caesaro-papism as well (1968, 1161).

5. Weber further describes: "The emergence of theology and of theological training is one of the strong buttresses of hierocratic power, compelling even the caesaro-papist state to permit an hierocratic influence on the subjects. A fully developed ecclesiastic hierarchy, with an established body of dogmas and particularly a well-organized educational system, cannot be uprooted at all" (1968, 1175).

6. For a detailed account of the term saisei itchi, see Daniel Holtom, Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism, p. 5 ff.

7. Presently the word matsuri means "festival."

8. Thus, sociologically speaking, some scholars' categorization of the prewar Japanese rulership as "theocracy" should be corrected to "caesaro-papism" (Kitagawa 1966, 202 ff., 246 ff.; 1987, pp. 77-97; Bunce 1955, 15; Murakami 1980, 65). Kitagawa's "immanental theocracy," in many respects, corresponds to our term caesaro-papism, but he put the primacy of religious authority over secular power. To repeat, our term "caesaro-papism" is the opposite edge of "theocracy" as a measurement of historical reality.

9. For the detailed discussion on ideal typical analysis, see Weber, The Methodology of Social Science (1949), especially "Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy," pp. 90-104. Refer also to my article (Moriyuki Abukuma), A Weberian Methodology of Sociological Studies.

10. The kamikaze pilot can be compared to the suicide bombers of Islam, Sikh, and Tamil militant groups.

11. Here, we speak an ideal type of the kamikaze pilot, leaving aside varieties of the kamikaze pilot.

12. Weber defines the term: "It [ethos] is not the ethical doctrine of a religion, but that form of ethical conduct upon which premiums are placed that matters. Such premiums operate through the form and the condition of the perspective goods of salvation. And such conduct constitutes one's specific ethos in the sociological sense of the word" (1946, 321). He uses the term "ethos" synonymously with "economic ethic," "practical ethic," "status ethic," "Lebensfuehrung (life conduct)," and "Gesinnung (ethical attitude)." For example, Weber defines the term "economic ethic" "the practical impulses for action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic contexts of religions" (1946, 267).

13. Confucian scholars were powerless guests among the ruling class in the Tokugawa period. According to John W. Hall's investigation, only 0.2 % of the upper and middle class was Confucian scholars in the Bizen domain of West Japan in 1765 (Hall 1959, 278).

14. Thus, this study objects to contemporary scholars' presumption that "the Shogun's rule in the Tokugawa model was legitimated by the Neo-Confucian principle" (Kitagawa 1987, 77). Contemporary scholars' assumption lacks the understanding of the principles of legitimacy and rulership. The Tokugawa Shogunate was founded by feudal rulership, not by a patrimonial one. One needs to distinguish the Tokugawa's wish from its actual bases; he wished to be a patrimonial ruler like the Chinese emperor, but he had to depend on the feudal relationship with the vassals and on the divine tradition of the emperor.

15. Hall describes the discord between feudal legitimacy and Confucian legitimacy: "Confucian ideals and the actual political order in Tokugawa Japan were never in perfect accord. In particular, there were difficulties with the Japanese practice of dual sovereignty. If Confucian theory could hold that the Shogun receives authority over the people of Japan as a 'trust from Heaven,' it could also (as did the Mito school) support the traditional (and Shintoist) legal function that the authority came as a trust from the emperor. At any rate, the actual institutional and ceremonial relationship between emperor and Shogun continued, in fact, to be ritualized in the practices of Shinto" (1959, 290).

16. Look at the Chushingura ("the fealty and honor of the vassals"), the most popular play based on a factual incident in the Tokugawa period. This play shows the best example what feudal ethos is. In this play, the vassals of the abolished domain take revenge on lost lord and then commit suicide. The vassals believed that the revenge was the best action to express their fealty to the lord. They sacrificed filial piety and family obligation on behalf of samurai fealty and honor. They even disregarded the Tokugawa samurai code which prohibited plot and unauthorized revenge. On the other hand, they regarded that committing suicide was a honorable conduct to remind of their sense of status dignity. Here the play exalts fealty and status honor but downgrades the value of filial piety and obedience to the supreme Tokugawa code.

17. For example , the Aizu domain had merely three Confucian instructors among the total of 128 instructors, while she had 106 military instructors in the 1860s (Hall 1959, 297). "All that remained to them [Confucian scholars] was the area of social ethics" (Hall 1959, 301).

18. Hall states: "What is most impressive about the basic political institutions of the Tokugawa regime is that they owe little or nothing to Chinese models... At the core of the daimyo system of government was the clan-like relationship between feudal lord and vassals" (1959, 292).

19. "Rulership is the probability that a command with a given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons" (Weber 1968, 53).

20. To analyzes legitimacy, however, is not easy because it is often the presupposition of a society and, therefore, not recognized in historical materials explicitly. Interest in legitimacy works within the unconscious motivation of the ruling class.

21. These processes of depersonalization of charisma are called "routinization of charisma." See Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 1121-1148. Refer also to Abukuma, Routinization of Charisma in Early Christianity.

22. This study translates the German term "Geschlechterstaat" into the "hereditary state" instead of the "clan state" as found in Roth and Wittich designated (Weber 1968, 250), or of the "familistic state" as found in Gerth and Martindale designated (Weber 1958, 271). Our term "the hereditary state" indicates its charismatic nature. The terms "the clan state" and "the familistic state" seem to lack the implication of the charismatic nature.

23. "Discipline is nothing but the consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of the received order, in which all personal criticism is unconditionally suspended and the actor is unswervingly and exclusively set for carrying out the command" (Weber 1968, 1149).

24. To maintain a stable structure, bureaucratic rulership usually needs a charismatic head (Weber 1968, 263).

25. For detailed arguments of the historical figure of Jimmu, the dates, and the process of conquest, see Abukuma, An Origin of Shinto. Abukuma's arguments stand on the hypotheses of Yamatikoku of Yamato (Naito 1981, Kasai 1981, Mori 1986) and utilize genealogical principles (Ota 1928 and 1929, Mizoguchi 1973 and 1974) as well as Weber's sociological principles.

26. According to the Nihongi, Jimmu's expedition took several years; it was full of affliction and difficulties including his brothers' death, detour, storm, illness, hunger and so forth (Aston I, 109-31).

27. Masao Maruyama's definition of "national consciousness" as "a self-awareness, sooner or later congeals into a consciousness of political unity" is unable to describe the foundation of Japan (1974, 324). He denies the national consciousness of the Yamato state: "the birth of a national consciousness ... did not occur in Japan until the Meiji Restoration" (1974, 327). He did not grasp the decisive element of national consciousness, "the joint memory of the struggle of life and death."

28. Himiko is probably the first prophetess, that is, the speaker of the word of the god, in the Imperial line. The original name of the emperor, sumera-mikoto, ("tenno" is the translation into Chinese characters), means dwelling or speaking (sumera) the holy word (mikoto), although Nobutsuna Saigo argues that sumera means "being clean" (1985, 117-43). The unprecedented revelation and its demonstration of the proof were powerful enough to believe Himiko the spokesperson of the god (sumera-mikoto).

29. Here this study adopts the hypothesis that Queen Himiko was Princess Yamato-toto-momoso-hime during the period of Sujin (Kasai 1981, Higo 1971, Harada 1969). The prophetess Himiko can be compared to Miriam and Deborah, the Israel prophetesses, and Dodona and Delphei, the prophetesses in ancient Greece. Although Queen Himiko demonstrated the characteristics of a prophetess, she was not primary religious. The goal of her prophecy was secular. Therefore, she was a caesaro-papist ruler, not theocratic. Refer to Abukuma, An Origin of Shinto.

30. The primary method of the pacification was to proclaim the command of the god (koto-muke), showing the evidences (the mirror, the jewel and the sword) of the heavenly messenger. In the case of disobedience, physical enforcement was followed. Suffering from the violence and exploitation by "men's house" gangs (araburu-kami), the agrarian people were willing to believe the messenger of the divine nation.

31. This study also adopts the hypothesis that the myth of Amaterasu, the supreme Goddess of Japan, is a reflection of Queen Himiko (Harada 1978) and that the carriers of the mission were the prince generals (Ueda 1959).

32. The Nihongi says: "The emperor [Himiko] sent Oho-hiko no Mikoto to the northern region, he sent Takenu-kaha wake to the Eastern Sea, he sent Kibi-tsu-hiko to the Western road, he sent Tamba no chi-nushi no Mikoto to Tamba... He granted them all alike seals and ribbons, and appointed them generals" (Aston I, 155-6).

33. Chinese chronicles count 28 countries that Himiko unified. Some scholars identify the counties (Naito 1981, Yamada 1981, Harada 1967). Himiko placed the frontier guards (hina-mori) at northern Kyushu, Hokuriku and Kanto (Kasai 1981 b).

34. The Nihongi says: "Profound peace prevailed in the Empire. Therefore he [Himiko] received the title of the emperor, the august founder [unifier] of the country" (Aston I, 161). It honors Jimmu and Himiko with the same title hatsu-kuni-shirasu (the founder of the nation).

35. The conquerors distinguished themselves from the indigenous people, the spider-like dwellers in caves (tsuchi-kumo), the shrimp-like draft people (ezo and emishi) and the bear-like barbarians (kumaso). In the Nihongi, Jimmu speaks of the uncivilized indigenous people with the conqueror's superiority and mission: "At present things are in a crude and obscure condition, and the people's minds are unsophisticated. They roost in nests or dwell in caves. Their manners are simply what is customary. Now if a great man were to establish laws, justice could not fail to flourish" (Aston I, 131). For a detailed account of the indigenous people, see Gyo Shinya, Kodai Tenno sei kokka to genjyumin ("The Ancient State of the Emperor and the Indigenous People").

36. Here, this study objects to contemporary scholars' assumption that the Yamato state was a confederation among equal chieftains, "a primus inter pares" (Waida 1976, 323; Kitagawa 1987, 85). They lack the understanding of the hereditary state and the nature of the power-struggle between the ruler and the staff. They confuse the battle among equal chieftains in the Yayoi period with the power-struggle between the house of the founder and the houses of the followers. Namio Egami clearly points out the special position of the emperor: "We should notice a remarkable fact on the Imperial succession. The candidates of the throne never slipped from the Imperial line no matter how the powerful staff utilized the succession issue for their power-struggle or no matter how an able person climbed to the actual power holder manipulating the emperor.... In other words, the legitimacy of heredity guaranteed the position of the Imperial House for all the time. It is a fundamental presupposition of the Japanese that the emperor has to come from the Imperial line" (1984, 243-44).

37. Mutsuko Mizoguchi points out the peculiarity of the hereditary clan system (uji-kabane) in which all right and privileges depended on their factual or alleged origin in the national foundation. See Mizoguchi, Kodai shizoku no keifu ("the structure of the early Japanese clan").

38. The Shinsen shojiroku ("The New Register of Clans") covered almost all the genealogies of the noble clans who occupied the high official positions at that time. It was compiled in 815 after the failure of patrimonial attempts such as Taika Reform in 675 and the establishment of new capitals and administrations in 712 and 794.

39. Weber writes: "If the political ruler wants to create an apparatus of officials and a counter weight against the nobility, the natural opponent of such a patrimonial or bureaucratic rationalization, he cannot wish for a more reliable support than the influence of the monks" (1968, 1171).

40. Weber describes the distinctive conduct of life of the monk and its influence to the lay people: "The monk lived in a methodical fashion, he scheduled his time, practiced continuous self-control, rejected all spontaneous enjoyments and all personal obligations that did not serve the purposes of his vocation. Thus he was predestined to serve as the principal tool of bureaucratic centralization and rationalization in the church [and also the state] and, through his influence as priest and educator, to spread corresponding attitudes among the religious laymen" (1968, 1173).

41. For a detailed account of the wandering monk, see Kitagawa, Religion in Japanese History, (1966) pp. 39-57.

42. Gyogi was once arrested in 717.

43. Weber writes: "The sovereign, descending from the spirit of the sun was, as in China, supreme priest" (1958, 275).

44. By the institutionalization of the state cult, the original rite of great sacrifice (oho nie no matsuri) was divided into the coronation ceremony (daijo sai), the new food propitiation (nie name sai), and the godly festival (kan name sai). See Abukuma, An Origin of Shinto.

45. The Department of Shinto (Jingikan) "supervised all the officially sponsored shrines" and "controlled all aspects of Shinto" (Kitagawa 1987, 89). "Its duty was to oversee the registers of the entire priesthood and of the religious corporation, the personnel of the Jingikan [Shinto official] itself and the staffing of the principal shrines" (Bock 1970, 19).

46. Yosaburo Takekoshi writes about the power of sacrilege: "Nobody had yet committed such sacrilege. Kiyomori [1118-1181] was the first to have shot at the sanctuary" (1930, 90).

47. Takekoshi describes a reason for the growing monastic land: "People soon began to think it to their advantage to offer their land to the temples, becoming soji [danka] (manorial governor), who took charge of the land and received a certain percentage of the return. Many avail themselves of it, not from any particular love of Buddhism, but to protect themselves from the illegal interference and lawless taxation of the local governors. A tacit understanding made the post of soji [danka] hereditary in the family of the contributor" (1930, 84).

48. Kitagawa writes: "Many aristocratic families donated quarters to the clergy as well as land to temples in order to maintain de facto control over properties" (1966, 57).

49. Weber also says: "In Japan the ruler [the emperor] attempted in this fashion to emancipate himself from the dominance of aristocratic families which had hereditary charisma" (1968, 1078).

50. Hajime Nakamura argues: "It was within the framework of their own peculiar nationalistic standpoint and orientation that the Japanese accepted Buddhism. They were inclined to utilize it as a means and an instrument to realize a certain socio-political end. They were not converted to Buddhism. They converted Buddhism to their own tribalism" (1964, 528).

51. Weber writes: "the powerlessness of the insulated monarch [the emperor], who is an incarnation, resulted ... in the seizure of power by a family that was not encumbered with the monarch's charismatic obligations and hence can provide the real ruler (major domus, Shogun)" (1968, 1158).

52. They were "to seek not enlightenment' but salvation' in the Pure Land" (Kitagawa 1966, 112).

53. Suffering from persecution, Nichiren said: " Since I have been born in the ruler's domain, my body is subject to him. But my heart is not subject to him" (1990, 240). For the supremacy of religious authority, he says: " Following the true law of the Buddha, the nation prospers and the people live long. But disobeying the true law of the Buddha, the nation perishes and the people live short" (1952, 1521). For a detailed account of Nichiren's supremacy of religious authority, see Yoshiro Tamura, Yogensha no Bukkyo ("Nichiren's Prophetic Buddhism"), 1967, 158-162.

54. Robert Bellah says: "He [Nichiren] was able to consider everything, even the emperor, as subordinate to the Buddha of the Lotus Sutra. Nichiren, with his political prophecy, is an almost unique figure in East Asia and one of the very few who can be compared with political prophets in the Old Testaments" (1970, 119). Masaharu Anesaki also characterizes Nichiren a unique prophet: "he stands almost a unique figure in the history of Buddhism ..., for his unshaken conviction that he himself was the messenger of Buddha" (1916, 3).

55. Oda burned three thousand buildings of Mt. Hiei (Enryakuji), and massacred all 1,600 men and women, children and elders (Kitagawa 1966, 140).

56. Kitagawa narrates the death-struggle between Oda and the Ikko sect: "In 1570 Nobunaga's forces attacked Ishiyama [the center of the Ikko sect], but the monto (followers of the sect) came from all parts of Japan to defend their holy city, and Nobunaga's army was completely defeated.... Nobunaga attacked the followers of the True Pure Land [Ikko] in the Owari district, near Nagoya, but failed miserably in 1571, 1573, and 1574. Then the desperate Nobunaga tricked the Ikko by offering peace, only to turn about and massacre nearly forty thousand believers in Owari. In 1575 he dispatched his forces to the Hokuriku district and massacred forty thousand more adherents of Ikko. In 1576 Nobunaga again attacked Ishiyama; however, not only was his army defeated, but he himself was wounded. In the following year Nobunaga's forces attacked the Wakayama district which had supplied men and materials to Ishiyama.... Finally, in 1580, the temple town of Ishiyama surrendered" (Kitagawa 1966, 141).

57. Hideyoshi Toyotomi, a Oda's vassal, completed the demilitarization of the Buddhist community and the subject. In 1578, Toyotomi subjugated other strongholds of the militarized monasteries (Negoro, Kumano, and Koya), and conducted the Sword Hunt all over the land. In 1586, Toyotomi summoned hundreds of the monk and priest from all sects and major monasteries to conduct the prayer for the Toyotomi Shogunate and the Toyotomi family. He intended to demonstrate his supremacy over religious authority. Nichio, the leader of the Fuju-fuse, alone refused the summon claiming the supremacy of Buddhist authority (buppo) over secular authority (oho). For a detailed account of this incident, see Herman Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology, (1985) p. 190.

58. Weber writes: "The ascension of the Tokugawa Shoguns put an end to this [the Christian mission]. They did not wish to exchange Buddhistic clericalism for the rule of a clergy directed from abroad" (1958, 280).

59. Reischauer and Craig estimate that "there were 150,000 Japanese converts around 1582, some 300,000 by the end of the century, and perhaps as many as 500,000 in 1615" (1978, 75).

60. In 1599 Ieyasu held a Buddhist service summoning a thousand monks and priests from all sects and major monasteries. Ieyasu followed the example of Hideyoshi to demonstrate the supremacy of his secular power over religious authority. And again Nichio refused to participate the service for the same reason that he made to Hideyoshi. Then Ieyasu held the doctrinal debate between the Fuju-fuse and other Nichiren sects. Ieyasu declared the defeat of the Fuju-fuse and banished Nichio and his followers. The Tokugawa Shogunate outlawed the Fuju-fuse again in 1630 and 1663. See Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology, (1985) pp. 190-2.

61. Before the Tokugawa period, Oda also demonstrated his supremacy over religious authority. Oda summoned the doctrinal debate between the Ikko sect and the Nichiren sect in Ohmi in 1579. He intentionally declared the defeat of the Nichiren sect, and forced the Nichiren Buddhists to stop its aggressive propagation. See Ooms, Tokugawa Ideology, (1985) pp. 36-7.

62. Ieyasu Tokugawa sided with the Abbot Kyonyo in a dispute with Abbot Junnyo over the succession of the 12th patriarch. Kyonyo's supporters became known as Higashi (East) Honganji and Junnyo's Nishi (West) Honganji.

63. A church, in the sociological term, means "a compulsory institution for universal salvation," in contrast to a sect, "a voluntary association of selected individuals." See Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 1163-4, 1204.

64. Kitagawa estimates that the number of temple increased to more than 35 times between the Kamakura and the Tokugawa periods: "Such a policy necessitated the existence of a temple in every town and village; thus, which there only 13,037 temples during the Kamakura era, the number increased to 469,934 during the Tokugawa period" (Kitagawa 1966, 164).

In contrast, the temple lands decreased from 40 % of the late Heian period to 1 % in the beginning of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Hall estimates the figure "something over one per cent of tax-bearing land of Japan, a figure estimated at 1444, 000 koku during the 1660s" (Hall 1959, 287).

65. The easy disestablishment of Buddhism in 1868 demonstrated how successfully the Tokugawa Shogunate transformed prestigious Buddhism into the illiterates' management of the magical cults. Once the Buddhist monk and priest lost prestige as the spiritual authority and learned intellectual authority, even long-lasting Buddhist tradition could not help prevent the destructive policies of the Meiji government.

66. Here the word "unorganized" refers to belief and value-orientation, not economic interest. In contrast, American society is characterized to the organized demos: "American democracy is not a sand-pile of unrelated individuals but a maze of highly exclusive, yet absolutely voluntary sects, associations and clubs, which provide the center of the individual's social life.... The sect and its derivations are one of her unwritten but vital constitutional elements, since they shape the individual more than any other influence" (Weber 1968, 1207).

67. Weber discusses: "Entrance into an office, including one in the private economy, is considered an acceptance of a specific duty of fealty to the purpose of the office in return for the grant of a secure existence. It is decisive for the modern loyalty to an office, in the pure type, it does not establish a relationship to a person, like the vassal's or disciple's faith under feudal or patrimonial authority, but rather is devoted to impersonal and functional purposes" (1968, 959).

68. Weber describes: "The revolution of the army and technical administration, under the pressure of external threat, overthrew the feudal military and office organization" (1958, 282).

69. An imperial edict promulgated in 1870 reads: "We solemnly announce: The Heavenly Deities and the Great Ancestress [Amaterasu Omikami] established the throne and made the succession secure. The line of Emperors in unbroken succession entered into possession thereof and handed it on. Religious ceremonies and government were one and the same (saisei itchi) and the innumerable subjects were united" (quoted in Holtom 1963, 6).

70. Kitagawa argues: "The sacred and inviolable emperor could not be held responsible for the management or mismanagement of national affairs. Consequently, actual authority rested neither in the throne nor in the people, but was in the hands of bureaucratic officials and powerful political, military, and financial cliques" (1966, 268).

71. The land taxing policy in 1873 caused farmer's revolt around the country. The government was forced to reduced the ratio of the tax. The samurai class also revolted at Saga in 1874, at Fukuoka and Yamaguchi in 1876.

72. The Constitution of the Imperial Japan (1889), Article 3 declares "the emperor is "sacred and inviolable". Thus, the super-human quality of the emperor also gained the legal-rational ground.

73. Weber generalizes the need of responsible offices instead of the charismatic leader: "The very fact that the charismatic ruler carries such a heavy burden of responsibility in relation to the ruled tends to create an urgent need for some form of control over responsibility to the ruled. Because of his exalted charismatic qualities such a ruler needs a person who can take over responsibility for the acts of government, especially for failures and unpopular measures" (1968, 1147).

74. Weber describes the impact of war discipline on democracy and bureaucracy: "The varying impact of discipline on the conduct of war has had even greater effects upon the political and social order.... Discipline gave birth to the Hellenistic polis with its gymnasia.... When cities resorted to naval discipline, they had a democratic structure (Athens). Military discipline was also the basis of Swiss democracy... Military discipline was also instrumental in establishing the rule of the Roman patriciate and, finally, the bureaucratic states of Egypt, Assyria and modern Europe" (1968, 1152).

Hackett describes the impact of military discipline on the Japanese society: "it [conscription] meant, at least temporarily, the breaking of family and village ties of civilian life for the more impersonal world of the armed forces. The hierarchic organization and the stern discipline present in the army probably allowed the young recruit more psychological security and an easier introduction into a changing world... More important, many peasants received their earliest introduction to reading and writing and technical skills" (p. 257).

75. Silberman argues: "the period after 1900 saw the bureaucracy pervade almost every aspect of Japanese life --from the regulation of the family to the determination of economic policy, from the regulation of reading matter to the determination of proper thought and action" (1974, 447).

76. Silberman discusses: "by 1900 the Japanese civil bureaucracy had evolved into a structure in which roles exhibited the major characteristics of the Weberian legal-rational type" (1974, 192).

77. Holtom characterizes the Japanese: "There is probably no nation on earth today more conscious of itself, its psychological and institutional characteristics, its problems and tensions, that is the Japanese" (1963, 15). William Theodore de Bary also observes that "if there is anything distinctive about the Japanese in this respect [national identity], it is not that they have some such identity but that they are so self-conscious about it" (1964, 86).

78. "The initiative [of passive democracy] came 'from on high' and a purely political nature, drawing advantage from political constellation, especially in foreign affairs. Here such leadership exploited economic and social antagoism as well as class interests merely as a measure for its own purpose" (Weber 1968, 986).

79. "Every successful imperialist policy of coercing the outside normally strengthens the domestic prestige and therewith the power and influence of those classes" (Weber 1968, 920).

80. "The naked prestige of power is unavoidably transformed into other special forms of prestige and especially into the idea of the nation" (Weber 1968, 922).

81. "It [emotional influence] is based upon sentiments of prestige" (Weber 1968, 921).

82. An imperial edict promulgated in the first year of Meiji (1868) reads: "The worship of the gods and regard for ceremonies [Shinto] are the great proprieties of the Empire and the fundamental principles of national polity and education.... The Way of the unity of religion and government (saisei itchi) shall be revived " (quoted in Holtom 1963, 5).

83. Holtom writes: "Into this religion [Shinto] the Japanese individual is born; loyalty to its belief and practice is his first qualification as a 'good Japanese.' It is not his by election; even when he chooses to attach himself to a universal religion like Buddhism or Christianity, the old is ever there as a vital, all-pervading influence, fundamentally conditioning his mentality and conduct and supplying a pattern to which all else must be accommodated" (1963, 2).

84. Kanzo Uchimura (1861-1930), the founder of Mukyokai (Non-church) Christianity, suffered from the first persecution on this institutionalization in 1891. He was expelled from his teacher's job at a high school when he rejected the worship of the emperor on behalf of his belief in Christianity. For a detailed account of this incident, see Carlo Caldarola, Pacifism among Japanese Non-church Christians (1973).

85. Tenri-kyo was founded by Miki Nakayama (1798-1887), a charismatic woman, in 1838 at Nara. She pronounced a doctrine of salvation of the world by the revelation of Tenri-O-no-Mikoto, a Shinto god. The government destroyed her meeting house and persecuted her and her followers in 1882. She suffered from 18 arrests.

86. Konko-kyo was founded by Bunjiro Kawade (1814-83), a farmer, in 1859 at Okayama. He proclaimed himself a living god (Konko Daijin).

87. Omotokyo was founded by Nao Deguchi (1837-1918), a prophetic woman, in 1892 at Kyoto Prefecture. She envisioned herself a medium of a god and wrote the god's commands in the Ofudesaki. In 1921, the government arrested Onisaburo Deguchi (1871-1948), a Nao's successor, and destroyed the head-quarters. Again, in 1935, the government arrested him and 60 high-ranking leaders, and destroyed all the buildings belonging to the sect.

88. The Hommichi sect was a sub-sect of Tenri-kyo and organized by Aijiro Onishi (1881-1958). He proclaimed himself a living god and claimed that Japan would be saved only by his teaching, Hommichi (the true path of salvation). In 1928, the government arrested him and other 180 leaders and dissolved the sect. Again, in 1938, the government arrested Onishi and 373 leaders and dissolved the sect. Onishi was put into jail until the end of World War II.

89. Among persecuted Christians, Mukyokai followers demonstrated "positive" pacifists who were willing to sacrifice their lives for the sin of the people accepting conscription but refusing to kill life, instead of "passive" rejection of conscription. Carlo Caldarola discusses: "this [Non-church] type of pacifism does not take the form of conscientious objection, but requires the believer to go to war in much the same manner as Christ going to the cross to die for the sins of others. The death of a Christian pacifist is a sacrifice." (1973).

90. For a detailed account of the persecution of Christianity, see Shigeyoshi Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, (1980) pp. 102-103.

91. For a story of the persecution of Soka Gakkai, see also Shigeyoshi Murakami, Japanese Religion in the Modern Century, (1980) pp. 108-9.

92. "Some sixteen thousand individuals during the years 1940-1945 were imprisoned by it for suspected disloyal sentiment" (Iglehart 1959, 253).

93. One of the new aspects of State Shinto, compared with early Shinto, is the worship of war dead. The government created the Shrine for the war dead, the Yasukuni Shrine, and consecrated the war dead.

94. Tadao Yanaihara (1893-1961), a Christian prophet, denounced the brutality and deception of war during the severe prosecution by the national militarists. In 1936, he wrote following accusation of war in a monthly magazine, Chuokoron: "War is illness; it is mental disorder of brutality and violence. War is evil and anti-truth. In opposition, truth creates order and abolish chaos; it loves life but condemns killing and violence. Truth loves peace but refuses war. Therefore, the seeker after truth has to oppose the institution and thought that causes war." (1993, 101).

95. In addition to the Kamikaze suicide bomber, the Nanjin massacre shows how extraordinary pathos and action war makes.

96. Nakamura argues: "The history of religion in Japan shows, just as Max Weber rightly pointed out [1958, 264], that the state functioned not as a patron (Schutz-patronat) but as the religious police (Religionspolizei) of Buddhism. And only on such a historical basis was the government after the Meiji Restoration able to attain complete religious control, and to push it to such an extreme that no parallel can be found in any other modern nation" (1964, 526).

97. A officer of the Allied power writes: "A direct attack of the imperial system would weaken the democratic elements, and, on the contrary, strengthen the extremist, both Communist and militarist. The Supreme Commander is, therefore, ordered to assist secretly in popularizing and humanizing the emperor" (quoted in Kitagawa 1966, 276).

98. To prevent a communist revolution, the Allied Force purged the leaders of the Community party, banned the publication of Akahata, the Communist Newspaper, and took other measures in 1950 (Kitagawa 1966, 283).

99. Fumimaro Konoe, the minister of the Imperial Household, illustrates a high official's fear of social disorder when the emperor as the unity of nation would be abolished. Konoe says: "From the standpoint of the preservation of our national polity, we are more afraid of the Communist revolution that might arise following the defeat than of the defeat itself" (Quoted in Kitagawa 1966, 269).